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The Intellectual Underpinnings of North
American Economic Integration
John Whalley*
Colleen Hamilton**
North America has developed two regional trade agree-
ments, the 1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Canada-
U.S. FTA)1 and the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).2 This Article traces the origins of these free trade
agreements (FTAs), identifies their underlying objectives, and
assesses their integrationist effect. We emphasize that continu-
ing economic integration in North America is more market-
based than policy-driven, reflecting an increase in border trade
and investment flows.
As such, there are clear differences between the post-war
European economic integration and the more recent model of
North American arrangements, and applying the word "integra-
tion" to these latter schemes is probably a misnomer. In North
America, the economies involved were already well integrated
before the recent regional trade agreements were concluded, es-
pecially in the Canada-U.S. case. They are not part of an ongo-
ing process to move ever closer to an economic and monetary
union as is an objective in Europe. North American trade agree-
ments have instead been driven more by the desire of smaller
countries (Canada and Mexico) to have more assured safe-haven
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Ontario, London, Canada.
** Research Analyst, Centre for the Study of International Economic Re-
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We are grateful to the Donner Canadian Foundation for its financial sup-
port of a project on Canada-U.S. trade from which this Article draws. This Arti-
cle draws on an earlier presentation to a conference on Economic and Political
Integration in Europe: The State of the Art, Edinburgh, Nov. 20-22, 1992. We
are grateful to Stephen Woolcock, Andrew Scott and others in attendance at the
conference for their comments on the presentation.
1. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, 27 I.L.M.
281 [hereinafter Canada-U.S. FTAI.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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agreements with their larger partner (the United States), than
simply by trade enlargement objectives. 3 These agreements re-
flect the concerns over the possible impact of U.S. trade actions
in such areas as anti-dumping, and the even wider concern that
U.S. trade policy could evolve in a more protectionist direction 4
so that without a trade agreement access to the U.S. market
might be threatened. In the case of Mexico, the desire to use a
regional FTA to bind prior domestic liberalization policy was
also an important consideration. 5
Furthermore, the North American trade agreements lack
the wider political and strategic objectives of fostering economic
interdependence to reduce the risk of regional conflicts, a key to
the European experience. A fundamental difference is the coun-
try configuration in North America, which has the United States
as a larger, dominant country interacting with Canada and Mex-
ico as smaller countries, as opposed to the small number of coun-
tries of more equal size seeking unity in Europe. Because there
is no compelling reason for the United States to move toward
deeper integration, the recent North American FTAs contain no
commitments to proceed further to unified capital markets, ex-
change rates, monetary union, and transnational courts. In
short, if recent North American trade agreements are equated
with regional economic integration, they differ sharply from the
post-war European arrangements. They differ both in substance
and form, reflecting sharply different objectives and containing
no road map for deeper integration.
3. Mexico's overriding objectives, for example in NAFTA, were to ensure a
more open and secure access to the world's largest market, and to assure in-
creased inflow of external capital. Gustavo Vega Canovas, NAFTA and the
Supplemental Agreements on Environmental and Labor Standards: A Mexican
Perspective, Presented at the Conference for NAFTA Implementation: Side
Agreements and Broader Implications 5 (June 23, 1993) (transcript available at
the Centre for Trade Policy and Law at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada).
The regional FTA would reduce the threat of U.S. protectionism and enhance
Mexican export opportunities in both the U.S. and Canadian markets. Id.
4. Canada especially held these concerns. For an extensive discussion of
recent trends in U.S. trade policy, see PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT
AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (1993).
5. See generally GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN
ASSESSMENT (1993); NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott eds., 1992); Symposium on North
American Free Trade, 14 WORLD ECON. 53 (1991).
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I. SUMMARIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS 6
A. THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The 1988 Canada-U.S. FTA covers a wide range of subjects
in twenty-one chapters, and is greater in length than the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 7 The Canada-
U.S. FTA contains an agreement on the elimination of tariffs
over ten years,8 including special arrangements for apparel, 9
and provides a new set of procedures for resolving bilateral dis-
putes in countervailing and anti-dumping duties. It also con-
tains a series of arrangements and disciplines covering sectoral
and other matters such as agriculture, energy, autos, invest-
ment, services, wine and spirits, and procurement.
Despite its length and broad coverage, the Canada-U.S.
FTA is not intended to dramatically change the bilateral U.S.-
Canada trade flows. Prior to the agreement, trade between Can-
ada and the United States was already largely duty-free or at
low duty rates, and trade barriers in key sectoral areas, such as
textiles, steel, agriculture, and energy, remained largely un-
touched by the agreement. Before the consummation of the
agreement, the average tariff on Canadian exports to the United
States was approximately one percent, and nearly eighty per-
6. This section draws on the discussions of these two agreements in John
Whalley, Regional Trade Arrangements in North America: CUSTA and NAFTA,
in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 352 (Jaime de Melo & Arvind
Panagariya eds., 1993) [hereinafter Regional Trade Arrangements]; John
Whalley, CUSTA and NAFTA: Can WHFTA Be Far Behind?, 30 J. COMMON
MKT. STuD. 125 (June 1992) [hereinafter CUSTA and NAFTA].
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
8. An important feature of the Canada-U.S. FTA is the joint commitment
to eliminate duty drawbacks covering imports of materials from third countries
for bilateral trade as of January 1, 1994. The elimination of tariffs applies also
to autos and auto parts, and affects Japanese transplant production in Canada
shipped to the United States. See, e.g., Ronald J. Wonnacott, Canada's Role in
the U.S. -Mexico Free Trade Negotiations, 14 WORLD ECON. 79 (1991) (emphasiz-
ing the importance of this provision on autos and auto parts).
9. The Canada-U.S. FTA establishes a tariff quota for apparel set approxi-
mately at 1987 trade levels. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 1, ch. IV. Bilateral
trade is duty-free up to the quota, and at the most favored nation rate thereaf-
ter. Id. Also, for trade in apparel beyond the tariff quota, duty drawbacks are
allowed bilaterally. For example, a refund in Canada of Canadian duties is per-
mitted on fabric imports from the United States made into apparel and re-ex-
ported to the United States. Id. However, duty drawbacks are banned for
imported inputs from third countries. Id.
1995]
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cent of Canadian trade with the United States was duty-free.' 0
While there had been an increase in the use of contingent trade
measures (such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties), and
disciplining these measures was a major negotiating objective
for Canada," the impact on bilateral trade was relatively
small.12
Table 1 briefly summarizes the main provisions of the Can-
ada-U.S. FTA. Chapter I sets out the Scopes and Objectives,
and Chapter II provides General Definitions. Chapter III lays
out rules of origin, which have become even more important in
the trilateral NAFTA arrangement with the addition of Mexico.
Chapter IV details how various border measures, including tar-
iffs, duty waivers, and drawbacks, will work bilaterally, with Ar-
ticle 401 setting out the schedule and coverage for bilateral tariff
eliminations.
Table 1. Main Provisions of the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement
1. Tariff Elimination
Tariffs to be eliminated over a 10-year period beginning January 1, 1989, in
three different groups by product:
(1) tariffs to be reduced immediately: included are computers and equip-
ment, leather, some unprocessed fish, and animal feeds;
10. See CANADA, DEP'T OF FIN., THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 57 (1988); MINISTRY OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES OF
CAN., ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROS-
PECTS FOR CANADA, REPORT 311 (1985).
11. The sectoral conflicts created by subsidy and dumping issues have
nonetheless been sharp, and have seemingly not diminished with the conclu-
sion of the agreement. A recent conflict centered on Quebec Hydro's pricing
policies and the benefits to heavy power users and exporters to the United
States. U.S. Moves Threaten Norsk Plant, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 15,
1992, at B6 (detailing how Norsk Hydro AS located a plant in Bcancour, Que-
bec, in order to sell magnesium to the U.S. market). In December 1991, Quebec
Hydro faced a 32.8% interim duty after an initial finding of a subsidy, and in
February 1992, Quebec Hydro was levied with a 32.7% provisional anti-dump-
ing duty. Frangois Shalom, U.S. slaps 33% duty on Norsk's magnesium, GA-
ZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 14, 1992, at Fl.
12. In 1986, approximately three percent of Canadian trade was covered by
such measures in place at the time of the agreement's negotiation. This per-
centage excluded trade in softwood lumber where Canada agreed to a 15% ex-
port tax in return for a withdrawal of countervailing duty petitions by the
American lumber industry. Canada's bilateral use of anti-dumping actions
(though not countervail) was as extensive as by the United States. See J. LES-
TER & T. MOREHEN, TRADE BARRIERS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
(Canada, Dep't of Fin. Working Paper No. 88-3, 1989); John Whalley, Now That
the Deal Is Over: Canadian Trade Policy Options in the 1990s, 16 CANADIAN
PUB. PoL'Y 125 (June 1990).
[Vol. 4:43
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(2) tariffs to be eliminated in five equal stages: included are subway cars,
printed matter, furniture, hardwood plywood, and most machinery; and
(3) tariffs to be eliminated in 10 stages: included are most agricultural
products, steel, textiles and apparel, softwood plywood, and tires.
2. Agriculture
Both countries agreed to prohibit export subsidies on bilateral trade. Agri-
cultural tariffs to be eliminated over 10 years (provision included for Can-
ada to restore temporary tariffs on fresh fruits and vegetables under certain
conditions). Mutual exemption from restrictions under meat import laws.
Some non-tariff barriers eliminated as well.
3. Wine and Distilled Spirits
Measures cover listing, pricing, distribution practices, blending require-
ments, and the standards and labelling requirements of distinctive prod-
ucts. Objective is to provide equal treatment to Canadian and U.S. wine
and distilled products in each product category. Beer is excluded from this
chapter.
4. Energy
Canadian and U.S. rights and obligations under GATT affirmed regarding
trade restrictions in energy products including the prohibition on minimum
export or import price commitments. Export taxes, fees or charges on en-
ergy goods also prohibited. Any export restrictions must be designed not to
disrupt normal channels of supply or alter the product mix. Canada agreed
to eliminate one of the price tests that the National Energy Board applied
to exports.
5. Automotive Products
Tariffs on vehicles and auto parts to be phased out over 10 years. Auto Pact
safeguards and Canadian value-added commitments maintained for the
Big Three auto makers. Special rules of origin to apply to all vehicles
traded under the agreement. As long as safeguards are met, qualified pro-
ducers can import vehicles and parts duty-free into Canada from anywhere
in the world. Fifty percent of the direct production cost of any vehicle to be
incurred in Canada and the United States will qualify for duty-free status.
6. Government Procurement
Increases the amount of procurement open for competition in each market.
Threshold lowered from US$171,000 to US$25,000. All government
purchases above this threshold are open to competition for suppliers from
either country, unless reserved for small businesses or for national security
reasons. Transparency also improved.
7. Services
Both countries agreed to extend the principle of national treatment to prov-
iders of a list of commercial services listed in an Annex. Many commercial
services are included, but transportation, basic telecommunications, doc-
tors, childcare, and others are excluded.
8. Temporary Entry of Business Persons
Established reciprocal access for Canadian and American business travel-
ers to each market. Laws and regulations governing entry to each country
liberalized for business travelers.
1995]
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9. Investment
Extended national treatment to the establishment of new businesses; liber-
alized rules on acquisitions of existing businesses in Canada. Canadian re-
view threshold of direct acquisitions to increase to US$150 million. Limits
agreed on for certain performance requirements.
10. Financial Services
"Grandfathered" indefinitely, including a privilege for Canadian banks to
operate in more than one state without being subject to review after 10
years. Canadian banks in the United States to be able to underwrite and
deal in securities of Canadian governments. U.S. firms and investors ex-
empted from some aspects of the "10/25" rule. Financial institutions are
not covered by dispute settlement procedures of the agreement. Difficulties
are to be dealt with through consultations between appropriate government
departments.
11. Institutional Provisions-Chapter 18
Established necessary institutional provisions to manage the agreement.
Provides for mandatory notification of any measure; consultations at the
request of either party; referral to Canada-U.S. Trade Commission if con-
sultations do not resolve dispute; and dispute settlement procedures based
on panels composed of five members.
12. Binational Dispute Settlement in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases-Chapter 19
Either country's government may ask for a review of an anti-dumping or
countervailing duty determination by a bilateral panel with binding pow-
ers. Panels determine if existing laws have been applied correctly and
fairly. Findings by the panel are binding on both parties.
SOURCES:
CANADA, DEP'T OF ExT. AFF., THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
SYNOPSIS (1987).
D. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (1988).
MICHAEL HART, A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE STRATE-
GIC IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA (1990).
Chapter V provides a reaffirmation of the principle of na-
tional treatment to bilateral Canada-U.S. trade, and Chapter VI
discusses technical standards. 13 Chapter VII contains a long
discussion on agriculture, containing complex formulas but rela-
tively little of substance in terms of new bilateral liberalization.
Chapter VIII covers wine and distilled spirits, primarily setting
out disciplines on various domestic arrangements in Canada.
Chapter IX, covering energy, places limits on the use of domestic
pricing policies in Canada, and details security of supply ar-
rangements with a right of first refusal for the United States at
13. Most issues in this area were left to an ongoing five to seven year nego-
tiation process to implement the 1988 Canada-U.S. FTA, which has since been
superseded by NAFTA.
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the world price on specified amounts of energy in the event of
supply shortages.
Chapter X deals with trade in autos, grandfathering in ar-
rangements concluded earlier under the 1965 U.S.-Canada Auto
Pact. More importantly, Chapter X also heightens the previous
domestic content requirements so that on a comparable basis
the fifty percent rule under the Auto Pact is increased signifi-
cantly.' 4 Chapter XI covers emergency actions, including spe-
cial bilateral exceptions for any safeguard actions taken under
Article XIX of GATT. Chapter XII details limited exceptions for
trade in goods from the arrangements in other chapters. Chap-
ter XIII contains provisions relating to government procure-
ment, but most notably, does not cover state and provincial
governments on the two sides of the border. Chapter X1V on
services contains few substantive provisions, grandfathering in
all existing service arrangements in both countries, and promis-
ing that most favored nation treatment will apply to new service
provisions, while at the same time exempting most of the impor-
tant sectors from even these future arrangements.' 5
Chapter XV covers temporary entry for business persons,
and, with Chapter XVI on investment, raises the transaction
limit beyond which the screening provisions of Investment Can-
ada apply. Chapter XVII contains changes in financial services
arrangements on both sides of the border, covering regulations
affecting foreign branch operations and certain changes in cross-
border rules on reserves. Chapter XVIII details the institutional
provisions of the agreement, including a dispute settlement pro-
cedure covering the agreement itself.'6 These provisions, oper-
ating much like GATT dispute settlement mechanisms, provide
14. Under the new content rule, overhead and other indirect costs are not
included in the requirement that, for a car crossing the border to be declared
duty-free, 50% of the invoice price must represent costs incurred in either Can-
ada or the United States. CANADA, DEP'T OF ExT. AFF., THE CANADA-U.S. FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 151 (1988). The 1988 Canadian government's annotation of
the Canada-U.S. FTA suggested that the new rule was roughly equivalent to a
70% content rule under the previous Auto Pact basis for calculating content.
Id.
15. For a discussion of the treatment of services in the Canada-U.S. FTA,
see John Whalley, Services and the U.S.-Canada Relationship Beyond the FTA,
in THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 45 (Charles Doran &
Alvin Paul Drischler eds., 1991).
16. Chapter XVIII thus provides for the settlement of disputes over the in-
terpretation and implementation of the whole agreement. Canada-U.S. FTA,
supra note 1. It provides for the establishment of the Canada-United States
Trade Commission and sets out notification, consultation and binding arbitra-
tion panel procedures. Id.
1995]
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for panels, a conciliation process, and necessary withdrawals of
concessions. Chapter XIX contains the new bilateral dispute
settlement provisions in the areas of anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duties. 17 These provisions, which were temporary pend-
ing further agreement from a five to seven year negotiation
process to implement the 1988 Agreement, have subsequently
been incorporated in NAFTA. Chapter XIX creates a separate
dispute settlement and panel procedure for disputes involving
the use of countervailing and anti-dumping duty actions, differ-
ent from and beyond that contained in Chapter XVIII. Chapter
XX covers residual provisions, and Chapter XXI details various
operational provisions, including entry into force, annexes, and
other matters.
To summarize, the Canada-U.S. FTA, beyond a phased-out
bilateral elimination of tariffs, contains four main sets of provi-
sions. The first set of provisions consists of new disciplines on
domestic (largely Canadian) policies, particularly in the areas of
energy and investment, and to a far less reaching extent quan-
titatively on wines and spirits. The second set of provisions, con-
sists of two dispute settlement chapters, Chapter XVIII and
XIX, with the latter reflecting the Canadian objective of achiev-
ing some new disciplines over U.S. anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duties. In the third set of provisions are chapters on key
sectors, including autos. The fourth set of provisions includes
the "empty" chapters dealing with services, agriculture, and pro-
curement; they are long and complex with seemingly little
substance.
17. Chapter XIX deals with disputes arising from anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duty (AD/CVD) cases. A binational panel makes determinations as
to whether or not an AD/CVD action being taken by either country is compati-
ble with its domestic law. When 'the agreement was signed in 1988, it was
agreed to develop and eventually implement a separate system of AD/CVD ar-
rangements that would simultaneously apply to both countries. This was left to
an ongoing five to seven year negotiation process to follow on after the agree-
ment, but with the finalization of NAFTA, such panels are now to be a perma-
nent feature. See D. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE CANADA-UNITED STATES
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 71-74 (1988); CANADA, DEP'T OF EXT. AFF., supra note
14, at 48-52; A. ANDERSON & A. RUGMAN, A REVIEw OF THE DISPUTE SETTLE-
MENT PROCESSES UNDER THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE
GATT (University of Toronto Working Paper, 1991) (evaluating the panel find-
ings thus far from disputes dealt with under these two chapters); see also T.
BODDEZ & M. TREBILCOCK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: REFORMING TRADE REMEDY
LAwS IN NORTH AMERICA (1993); Gilbert R. Winham, Dispute Settlement in
NAFTA and the FTA, in ASSESSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS 251
(Steven Globerman & Michael Walker eds., 1993) (discussing changes to the
dispute settlement mechanism under NAFTA).
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B. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
In many ways, the more recent NAFTA is an echo of the
earlier Canada-U.S. FTA.18 NAFTA has similar provisions in
autos and parts, textiles and apparel, anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duties, government procurement, services and invest-
ment, and temporary entry for business persons. Furthermore,
NAFTA contains important dispute settlement provisions. The
textile and apparel arrangements are also closely related. Only
in the areas of intellectual property and land transportation,
neither of which are covered by the Canada-U.S. FTA, are there
differences. 19
Table 2 summarizes the main provisions of NAFTA. At its
heart is a ten-year trilateral tariff elimination commitment with
the accompanying rules of origin, including special rules in the
key sensitive sectors of autos/auto parts and textiles/apparel. A
series of sectoral and instrument arrangements also appear in
the agreement. In energy, differential domestic and export
prices are disallowed. In agriculture, there is a key Mexican
commitment to phase out import restrictions for corn; there are,
however, no significant changes in U.S. and Canadian seasonal
restrictions in tomatoes, lettuce, and other horticulture prod-
ucts. Procurement, land transportation, and financial services
all see relatively modest change from the present regulatory en-
vironment. There are no special arrangements for steel.
NAFTA provisions covering services, investment, and tem-
porary entry of business persons are very similar to those in the
Canada-U.S. FTA.20 There is a statement of principles for ser-
vice trade restrictions, along with a greatly restricted scope due
to grandfathering of existing measures and sectoral exceptions.
These are thresholds below which investment screening will not
apply. NAFTA also provides for expedited entry procedures for
short-term business visitors.
18. See C.B. CADSBY & K WOODSIDE, THE EFFECTS OF THE NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ON THE CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE RELATION-
SHIP: A REVIEW ARTICLE (University of Guelph Department of Economics
Discussion Paper No. 1993-11, 1993); ASSESSING NAFTA: A TRINATONAL ANAL-
YSIS, supra note 17.
19. The provisions for intellectual property and land transportation never-
theless reflect the multilateral accords negotiated during the Uruguay Round
and contained in the Dunkel Draft. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/
W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991).
20. See Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 1, chs. 14-17.
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Table 2. Main Provisions of the NAFTA21
1. Tariff Elimination
Tariffs are phased out on goods meeting North American rules of origin
standards according to three timetables: immediate, over 5 years, over 10
years. There is also a special sensitive tariff category with a 15-year phase
out.
2. Textiles and Apparel
MFA quotas removed and tariffs to be phased out over 10 years on textiles
and apparel that meet specific North American rules of origin ("yam-for-
ward" rules specify all processing from yam onward must be in one of the
three countries). Special tariff quotas apply for non-qualifying trade, as do
phase-out commitments for quotas on non-qualifying trade. Special safe-
guard provisions were agreed upon for importers.
3. Autos and Parts
Tariffs on light trucks to be reduced by 50% immediately and remaining
tariffs to be eliminated over 5 years. Tariffs on other vehicles to be phased
out over a 10-year period. Each country committed to eliminate tariffs on
certain parts immediately and reduced other tariffs over a 5 or 10-year pe-
riod. Special rules of origin apply in this sector, requiring eventually 62.5%
North American content for passenger automobiles, light trucks, and their
transmissions and engines. Sixty percent North American content will ap-
ply in other vehicles and auto parts. North American content is to be calcu-
lated by tracing import content from outside NAFTA through the
production chain.
4. Energy
No differential domestic and export (or import) pricing of energy and pe-
trochemical products. Mexico is exempt from provisions dealing with im-
port and export restrictions. Specific commitments relating to Canada-U.S.
energy trade that were laid out in the Canada-U.S. FTA continue to apply
to the two countries.
5. Agriculture
Ten-year phased elimination of tariffs and quotas, except in dairy, poultry,
eggs, and sugar. Fifteen-year phase out for sensitive products (corn, dry
beans in Mexico; orange juice and sugar in the United States). U.S. sugar
will continue to be protected by global quotas; increases in imports from
Mexico will be at the expense of non-NAFTA suppliers (Philippines, Brazil,
Caribbean).
6. Anti-dumping/Countervail
Disputes over the use of these instruments are to be resolved by a panel
system which reviews whether actions by countries are consistent with do-
mestic laws (similar to the Canada-U.S. FTA).
7. Government Procurement
Increased the coverage of federal contracts open to competitive bidding
from each country.
21. These provisions are as of August 12, 1992.
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8. Services
National treatment and most-favored-nation treatment enshrined as basic
obligations, but most existing service regulation grandfathered in, and ex-
ceptions specified to the obligation.
9. Land Transport
Timetable for removal of the barriers to land transportation services in-
cluded as well as for the establishment of compatible technical and safety
standards.
10. Investment
Performance requirements are banned for NAFTA investment transac-
tions, although government procurement, export promotion and foreign aid
activities are exempt. Screening procedures only permitted above specified
limits ($150 million after 10 years for Mexico).
11. Financial Services
National treatment and right-to-establish granted in financial services.
12. Intellectual Property
Commitments set out in a number of categories (copyrights, patents, trade-
marks, designs, trade secrets, integrated circuits, and others). Similar to
commitments agreed upon multilaterally in GATT Uruguay Round Dunkel
text.
13. Temporary Entry
New rules to facilitate easier cross-border business travel.
14. Environment
No country may lower its standards to attract investment; affirms each
country's right to set own environmental standards. Disputes involving en-
vironmental standards or trade measures taken under specified environ-
mental agreements can be referred to the NAFTA dispute settlement
mechanism.
15. Trade Commission
Trilateral commission (much as in the Canada-U.S. FTA) to take up dis-
putes over the agreement itself.
16. Entry into force
NAFTA entered into force January 1, 1994.
17. Accession
Other countries may be admitted to NAFTA subject to approval by the
NAFTA parties and subject to terms and conditions.
18. Side Agreements
NORTH AMERiCAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CO-OPERATION.
Establishes Commission for Environmental Co-operation and sets up a co-
operative work program. All three countries agree to comply with their do-
mestic environmental laws. Strict procedures to resolve disputes. Trade
sanctions could be used to enforce a dispute resolution between the United
States and Mexico (only if a monetary penalty is not paid). Canada exempt
from trade sanctions as enforcement mechanism. Disputes involving Can-
ada to be resolved through domestic courts.
NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR Co-OPERATION.
Establishes Commission for Labor Co-operation and sets up co-operative
work program and consultation process. Dispute settlement similar to that
1995]
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under environment agreement. Canada again exempt from trade sanctions
as enforcement mechanism.
SOURCES:
Various summaries of the agreement published immediately following Au-
gust 11, 1992 in WALL STREET J., GLOBE AND MAIL, FIN. POST, and
others.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(Aug. 12, 1992) (prepared by the Governments of Canada, the United
Mexican States, and the United States of America).
Colleen Hamilton, News and Events, 16 WORLD ECON. 1 (1993).
CANADA, DEP'T OF EXT. AFF. & INT'L TRADE, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT: THE NAFTA MANUAL (1993).
CADSBY & WOODSIDE, supra note 18.
Unlike the Canada-U.S. FTA, NAFTA contains intellectual
property provisions. These provisions, however, largely restate
what is already in portions of the Uruguay Round decisions (the
Dunkel text).22  Dispute settlement provisions are also similar
to those in the Canada-U.S. FTA, covering disputes about the
agreement itself and panel procedures concerning anti-dumping
and countervailing duty issues. An important innovation in the
negotiations leading to the agreement was the two-track proce-
dure leading to the side agreements, separating out social issues
such as environment and workers' rights from more traditional
trade issues. 23
The prior bilateral Canada-U.S. FTA helped the three coun-
tries focus the trilateral NAFTA negotiations, given the early
concern of whether and how the bilateral agreement could be
trilateralized.2 4 The negotiations that followed centered around
22. See NUR 055, GATT (Dec. 3, 1992).
23. In May 1991, in order to gain congressional approval of fast-track nego-
tiating authority in the talks with Mexico, President Bush submitted an "action
plan" to Congress. CONG. Q. 1121 (1991). According to this plan, the Bush Ad-
ministration stated that the Labor Department would sign an agreement with
Mexico providing for cooperation on working conditions and child labor. Id.
Environmental issues would be negotiated on a parallel track and would deal
with air and water pollution, hazardous wastes and spills, pesticides and en-
forcement. Id. An environmental assessment of the agreement was also to be
completed. Id. When President Clinton was elected, he promised further nego-
tiations on environment and labor which resulted in the side agreements.
24. Achieving a three-country North American free trade agreement was
the objective of the U.S., Canadian and Mexican trilateral trade negotiators
since the spring of 1991, when the U.S. Congress granted the Bush Administra-
tion authority for bilateral trade negotiations with Mexico. An existing 1987
U.S.-Mexico framework understanding and other subsequent accords had al-
ready approximately doubled some Mexican textile quotas and achieved a de-
gree of bilateral liberalization in steel. For further discussion, see I. Trela &
[Vol. 4:43
NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
how NAFTA and the Canada-U.S. FTA would coexist. Was
NAFTA to be a core three-way agreement with separate addi-
tional bilateral agreements which would replace the Canada-
U.S. FTA? Was it to be a supplementary agreement beyond the
scope of the Canada-U.S. FTA? What institutional form was
NAFTA going to take? A trilateral trade commission, for in-
stance? Or something else? It quickly became apparent that
some of the key chapters of the Canada-U.S. FTA were designed
to deal with issues exclusively without the Mexican analogue
(the wine and spirits chapter, for instance). On the other hand,
some of the key issues discussed between Canada and Mexico
(environment, intellectual property, labor mobility) had no obvi-
ous analogues on which to draw from the Canada-U.S.
negotiation.25
NAFTA is thus a partial echo of the Canada-U.S. FTA. The
eventual agreement contained phased tariff cuts, similar dispute
settlement procedures, slightly changed chapters in the cases of
autos, textiles, and energy, and similar "empty" chapters. Some
new arrangements in NAFTA cover transportation, intellectual
property, environment, and labor standards. Like the U.S.-Can-
ada FTA, outside of tariff elimination, NAFTA contains rear-
ranged protection as well as substantive liberalization. Most of
the more meaningful non-tariff concessions are on the Mexican
side (in autos, beans, and corn). NAFTA, however, does not deal
with any specific process for achieving further integration, and
both its complexity and partially empty chapters equally per-
vade the agreement.
Consequently, while containing liberalizing elements, like
the Canada-U.S. FTA, NAFTA is in fact more of a comprehen-
sive trade agreement than a free trade agreement. It now has
the key sectoral protection left in place or rearranged and con-
tains supplementary agreements covering a range of non-trade
and social issues, such as labor mobility, environment, transpor-
tation, and investment. NAFTA reflects the approach of a simi-
lar bilateral tariff elimination, with accompanying sectoral and
instrument arrangements. NAFTA, however, contains neither
commitment to, nor specifications for, any wider process of eco-
nomic integration.
John Whalley, Trade Liberalization in Quota-Restricted Items: U.S. and Mexico
in Textiles and Steel, 15 WORLD ECON. 45 (Jan. 1992). See also Appendix II for
a chronology of the NAFTA negotiations.
25. See MICHAEL HART, A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA (1990) (analyzing the Canada-U.S. FTA
on a chapter-by-chapter basis with respect to its trilateralization).
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II. THE INTELLECTUAL FORCES BEHIND THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
As we have suggested above, the Canada-U.S. FTA and
NAFTA are complex and detailed treaties involving disciplines
on domestic policy and lowered protection. Neither of the two
agreements, however, is committed to a deeper integration pro-
cess. What factors and intellectual developments brought about
this outcome?
The remarkable fact about both the Canada-U.S. FTA and
NAFTA is that each is a result of smaller countries approaching
a larger country and demanding a trade agreement. Usually,
economists think of small countries as having little leverage in
trade negotiations with large countries, and large countries as
preferring to initiate bilateral negotiations with small countries.
In the case of North America, however, trade negotiations took
place as a result of two small countries (Canada and Mexico).
interacting with one dominant country, the United States. The
form which these two agreements have taken reflect this unique
phenomenon where Canada sought a "safe haven" or insurance-
based agreement, and Mexico had similar objectives and also
sought to use a trade agreement as an effective way of locking in
domestic policy reform. 26
A. CANADIAN TRADE INITIATIVES AND U.S. RESPONSES
1. Earlier Negotiation Attempts by Canada
As detailed in Appendix I, early Canadian attempts to nego-
tiate bilateral trade agreements with the United States date as
far back as 1854, long before the 1867 Canadian Confederation.
The historical pattern of Canadian-initiated requests for a bilat-
eral agreement was to back away from whatever had been tenta-
tively achieved as a result of internal political struggles relating
to the Canadian position. Such policy reversals occurred in
1891, 1896, 1911 and 1948. For example, the opposition won the
acrimonious Canadian general election of 1911, promoting a pol-
icy against the then-negotiated trade agreement with the
United States on the slogan of "no truck or trade with the
26. See C. PERRONI & JOHN WHALLEY, THE NEW REGIONALISM: TRADE LIB-
ERALIZATION OR INSURANCE? (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 4626, 1994) (suggesting that the more substantive concessions in the
Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA were made by the two smaller countries effec-
tively as an insurance premium in return for more secure access to the U.S.
market).
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Yanks."27 Given that the United States had abrogated the 1854
Elgin-Marcy Trade Treaty,28 the prevailing argument in Canada
was that strong multilateral disciplines should have preference
to any bilateral agreement with the United States.
Due to this record of inconsistency on the Canadian side,
the American approach to regional trade negotiations with Can-
ada over the years became one of dealing with trade frictions on
a case-by-case basis. Whenever questions of a comprehensive
trade arrangement arose, the American reaction was to sit back
and await a firm indication of Canadian intent, rather than ini-
tiating regional negotiations themselves.
2. Canadian Objectives for the Canada-U.S. FTA
By the early 1980s, the Canadian posture towards a possi-
ble bilateral trade agreement with the United States began to
change. There was a clear movement away from an exclusive
commitment to multilateral GATT arrangements and towards
new regional arrangements. The primary concern in the period
following the conclusion of the 1979 Tokyo Round was that the
multilateral process was likely to be too slow, and even ineffec-
tive, in dealing with Canadian trade interests. This concern
grew further during the 1981 recession with fears that Canada
could potentially be side-swiped by U.S. trade actions affecting
copper and other products. For example, a long series of studies
from the research community in Canada stressed how a trade
agreement with the United States would be able to exploit scale
economies. 29 This concern was even intensified by the newly
emerging arguments in Canada advocating a movement towards
bilateral negotiation with the United States. 30 By 1983, Canada
sought to go farther and faster down the bilateral route rather
than the multilateral route in addressing Canada's trade con-
27. For a discussion of the history of Canada-U.S. trade relations, see L.
ETHAN ELLIS, RECIPROCITY 1911: A STUDY IN CANADIAN-AMERIcAN RELATIONS(1939); O.C. MASTERS, RECIPROCITY 1846-1911 (1969); J.H. YOUNG, CANADIAN
COMMERCIAL POLICY (1957); R. Cuff & J. Granatstein, The Rise and Fall of Ca-
nadian-American Free Trade, 1947-48, 58 CANADIAN HIST. REV. 459 (1977).
28. ELLIS, supra note 27, at 1. The United States abrogated the Elgin-
Marcy Trade Treaty in 1866. Id.
29. See RONALD J. WONNACOTr & PAUL WONNACOTr, FREE TRADE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1967).
30. For the later influential study, see R.G. HARRIS & D. Cox, ONTAIO
ECONOMIC COUNCIL, TRADE, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND CANADIAN MANUFACTURING
(1984).
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cerns, 31 and the general consensus was for bilateral trade nego-
tiations with the United States. 32
The U.S. response to the initial Canadian request for a bi-
lateral negotiation was revealing and, in part, indicated the di-
rection which the negotiation was likely to take. The United
States treated Canada's idea of a comprehensive trade negotia-
tion with some caution; some circles saw the request as simply
yet another Canadian initiative that would falter domestically,
as in the past. The United States did, however, recognize the
Canadian request as an opportunity to deal with some outstand-
ing trade irritants, especially in the investment and energy ar-
eas. Moreover, it was recognized that a bilateral negotiation
with Canada could be useful in the pending GATT multilateral
negotiations. Comprehensive U.S.-Canada trade negotiations
would help in yielding bilateral arrangements which might be
multilateralized, especially in new areas such as services, and in
producing a parallel bilateral negotiation whose acceleration
could be used as a threat to bring reluctant multilateral part-
ners to the table. 33
As the process progressed through 1986, Canada's negotiat-
ing approach was to give priority to the security of access to the
U.S. market, looking especially for new restraints over U.S. con-
31. The Canadian domestic policy debate resulted first in a request for a
bilateral sectoral negotiation and evolved into the request for the broader Can-
ada-U.S. FTA, which implicitly began in 1983-1984 with a questioning of
whether giving preeminence to GATT was the best way of dealing with Can-
ada's then trade policy concerns.
32. The argument was later reflected in the 1985 report of the Macdonald
Commission, a key Federal Government Royal Commission which recom-
mended in favor of a bilateral trade negotiation with the United States. The
possibility of a bilateral negotiation had also been raised in earlier important
documents. See STANDING SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PARLIA-
MENT OF CANADA, CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS, VOL. II, CANADA'S TRADE
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES (1978); CANADA, DEP'T OF EXT. AFF., A RE-
VIEW OF CANADIAN TRADE POLICY (1983). For a further discussion of why Can-
ada pursued a bilateral negotiation, see Gilbert R. Winham, Why Canada
Acted, in BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY
37 (William Diebold, Jr. ed., 1988).
33. See USITC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 1984-1985, 61 (1986). The U.S. position
was as follows:
If the United States cannot reach timely trade agreements on a multi-
lateral basis, it is prepared to progress on trade issues by negotiating
on a bilateral or plurilateral basis with like-minded nations. ...
America believes bilateral and plurilateral negotiations can serve as a
useful step toward achieving a multilateral consensus.
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tingent protection in anti-dumping and countervailing duties.34
The key Canadian objective became one of seeking new disci-
plines over the application of U.S. countervailing duties, espe-
cially those involving U.S. actions against subsidies given to
Canadian firms for regional or social policy purposes.
Canada's initial proposal for an agreement that placed vari-
ous types of subsidies outside of the reach of U.S. countervail
proved fruitless, and in the end had to be abandoned after being
held onto until very late in the negotiation. The Canadian nego-
tiating approach nevertheless became one of offering a package
to the Americans, to which proposed disciplines on subsidies and
countervailing duties were judiciously appended. This process
included a bilateral negotiation on services which could subse-
quently be multilateralized, a negotiation on agriculture and on
other components which the United States might find useful
multilaterally. Having developed such a list, the next step for
Canada was to add proposals on subsidies, countervail, and anti-
dumping to the package. The United States' response to this ini-
tiative was that if Canada wished to package a number of issues
into what it called a comprehensive free trade agreement, they
would not object. The United States' main objective, however,
remained one of dealing with outstanding trade irritants. 35
The Canadian side repeatedly made efforts to engage the
Americans in a genuine negotiation on this basis over the eight-
een-month negotiating process; their efforts were unsuccessful.
In the last three weeks of the negotiation the Canadians with-
drew because of the lack of progress on the subsidy issue. They
were called back with ten days to go, largely due to the senti-
ments emanating from the U.S. Congress: if the United States
cannot negotiate a trade agreement with Canada, with whom
34. The dependency on the U.S. market for Canadian goods and jobs and
vulnerability to U.S. protectionism was a key concern. According to the Cana-
dian government, in 1984 almost $6 billion of Canadian exports to the United
States were affected by U.S. protectionist measures (including anti-dumping,
countervailing duties, and surcharges). See CANADA, DEP'T OF EXT. AFF., CANA-
D AN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1985). These measures affected a range of goods
such as steel, copper, asbestos, raspberries, softwood lumber and hogs. Id.
35. These trade irritants included features of the Canadian National En-
ergy Program used in the early 1980s, and the activities of the Canadian For-
eign Investment Review Agency, which conducted investment screening in
Canada. The Agency was the predecessor of the current milder screening
agency, Investment Canada.
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can it negotiate a trade agreement?36 Canada subsequently re-
sumed the negotiations with the United States.
The net result was a concession on subsidies made to the
Canadians in the last few hours. The final agreement substi-
tuted panel review for judicial review in bilateral trade remedy
cases involving anti-dumping and countervailing duties, the
now-famous Chapter XIX panels of the Canada-U.S. FTA. Be-
cause of the prior negotiating process, however, the final agree-
ment remained complex and lengthy, some chapters of which
were limited in substance.
B. MEXICAN CONSIDERATIONs BEHIND NAFTA
1. Timing of NAFTA Negotiations
The debates leading to the negotiations of NAFTA began
when the Canada-U.S. FTA negotiations ended (see Appendix
II). Due to the success of the Canada-U.S. FTA negotiations,
even from such disorganized origins, bilateral or regional negoti-
ation rapidly became a cornerstone of the emerging U.S. trade
policy. The U.S. government began to utilize active regional
agreements as a substitute for limited progress multilaterally,
and to use such negotiations as a threat to coerce reluctant mul-
tilateral partners. 37 In line with this new policy, the Reagan
36. Several Senate Finance Committee members, at various times during
the negotiations, acknowledged the difficulties in saying "no" to a trade agree-
ment with Canada. See Jerry Idaszak, Process and Politics, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES FORUM: CANADIAN-AMERICAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PROCEEDINGS 24
(1986). During the Senate Finance Committee's hearings on granting authority
to negotiate the Canada-U.S. FTA, Senator Bill Roth stated: "We have no
greater friend than Canada, economically, militarily and otherwise. It would be
a serious mistake to back away from an opportunity that may not come again in
a while." Id. Senator Bob Packwood, the Committee Chairman, stated: "If
there is any country we can conclude a free trade agreement with, it ought to be
Canada." Id. Furthermore, Committee members remembered that the Canadi-
ans had helped with the Iranian hostage crisis. According to Senator Bill Brad-
ley, saying "no" to Canada would alienate a key ally:
Canada has flirted with the idea of a trade agreement with us for 100
years. At some political risk, however, the Canadian government has
courageously chosen to follow through with actual talks. Disapproval
by the Finance Committee would be a slap in the face-especially at a
time when Canada is one of only three countries that strongly support
our response to Libyan terrorism.
132 CONG. REC. E1309 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
37. For example, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, stated:
The FTA with Canada means that the United States can say in Ge-
neva, 'if you won't work with us to open up world trade, then we can
negotiate trade agreements with other countries on a bilateral basis
and those countries will have the advantage of it and you won't be
sharing in it.'
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Administration began the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
(EAI), proposing framework agreements for individual Latin
American countries, a policy which continued under the Bush
Administration. 38 It was no accident that in December 1990,
when the Brussels GATT Ministerial was floundering in the
supposed conclusion of the Uruguay Round, President Bush was
in Latin America promoting the EA.
The three-country participation and the existence of the
Canada-U.S. FTA both complicated and accelerated NAFTA ne-
gotiations. Canada participated in NAFTA negotiations with a
strategy based on the outcome of the earlier Canada-U.S. FTA:
not only to protect and preserve what was deemed beneficial to
it, but also to actively seek to open up the unsatisfactory por-
tions.39 Moreover, Canada had a strong desire to be at the table
and fully informed of the negotiation process so that Canada
could avoid a "hub and spoke" situation where the United States
could obtain preferential treatment in both Mexico and Can-
ada.40 Canadian participation was also politically important to
Mexico because Mexican negotiators would not be alone at the
table with a large and potentially assertive power who could be
seen domestically as dictating the terms of NAFTA.4 1
134 CONG. REC. S12783 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1988) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
38. In June 1990, President Bush launched the Enterprise for the Ameri-
cas Initiative (EAI) with the stated objective of forming a free trade zone from
Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego. See Eduardo Gitli & Gunilla Ryd, Latin Ameri-
can Integration and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 26 J. WORLD
TRADE 25 (1992). The EAI focused on three pillars: trade, investment and debt.
Id.
39. Officially, Canada's three objectives in participating in the NAFTA ne-
gotiations were the following: (1) to gain access to the Mexican market on an
equal footing with the United States; (2) to improve and protect the Canada-
U.S. FTA; and (3) to make sure Canada remained an attractive investment lo-
cation relative to the United States and Mexico. See CANADA, DEP'T OF EXT.
AFF. & INT'L TRADE, NAFTA: WHAT'S IT ALL ABoUT? (1993).
40. The one situation Canadian negotiators did not want to see develop
was a situation in which the United States had a preferential agreement with
Mexico and a preferential agreement with Canada. For a further discussion on
"hub and spoke," see RONALD J. WONNACOrr, THE ECONOMICS OF OVERLAPPING
FREE TRADE AREAS AND THE MEMCAN CHALLENGE (C.D. Howe Inst. Commen-
tary XIV, 1991); C. KowALczYK & R.J. WONNACOTr, HUBs AND SPOKES, AND
FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 4198, 1992).
41. The NAFTA negotiations concluded on August 12, 1992. However, the
Clinton Administration subsequently indicated that the agreement would not
be submitted to Congress until side agreements on labor and the environment
were negotiated. The subsequently negotiated side agreements lay out the
principles of protection for labor and the environment and establish trilateral
commissions for both labor and the environment. Under these side agreements,
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2. Mexican Policy Considerations
For a variety of policy reasons, 42 Mexico was the main de-
mander for NAFTA negotiations, which were rapidly trilateral-
ized to include Canada.43 From the Mexican side, a trade
negotiation with the United States was attractive to different
groups within Mexico. First, NAFTA is key to Mexico's contin-
ued economic growth. Mexico's drive for NAFTA directly re-
sulted from its own unilateral liberalization, begun in 1985, and
its entry into GATT in 1986. 44 Despite major concerns over na-
tional autonomy, negotiating such an agreement would enable
Mexico to join the world economy. 45 Without NAFTA, Mexico
would suffer from continued oil dependency, a lack of much
disputes between Mexico and the United States can eventually result in trade
sanctions. Canada, however, successfully pressed for an exemption from the
use of trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism. Disputes involving Can-
ada in these areas will be dealt with through the domestic courts. For a discus-
sion of the side agreements, see CANADA, NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL CO-OPERATION (1993); CANADA, NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT
ON LABOR Co-OPERATION (1993); Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, Prime
Minister Announces NAFTA Improvements: Canada to Proceed with Agree-
ment (Press Release, Dec. 2, 1993); CANADA, DEP'T OF ExT. AFF. & INT'L TRADE,
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE NAFTA MANUAL (1993).
See also Derrick Wilkinson, NAFTA and the Environment: Some Lessons for the
New Round of GATT Negotiations, 17 WORLD ECON. 395 (1994).
42. In light of NAFTA, Mexico's main policy objectives are to achieve rapid
economic growth, reduce inflation and restore confidence necessary to re-attract
flight capital and to service its large external debt, focusing on fiscal and mone-
tary stringency, deregulation, privatization and further liberalization of trade
and investment policies. Vega Canovas, supra note 3, at 4.
43. For a detailed discussion of the interaction between the policy objec-
tives for NAFTA among Mexico, the United States and Canada, see HART,
supra note 25, at 1-11.
44. For more than 40 years, Mexico followed a development strategy based
on the import substitution approach. Following the debt crisis in the early
1980s and feeling the effects of the weak oil market, the Mexican government
abandoned the inward looking strategy and undertook a unilateral liberaliza-
tion program. For detailed discussions of Mexico's objectives in the NAFTA ne-
gotiations, see NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 5; Nisso Bucay & Eduardo Perez Motta, Mexico, in DEALING WITH
THE NORTH: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 211
(John Whalley ed., 1987); Gustavo Vega, Editorial Introduction to Symposium
on North American Free Trade, 14 WORLD ECON. 53 (1991).
45. As a result of the liberalization policy, Mexico joined GATT in 1986,
significantly reduced its tariffs, and liberalized its policy in foreign investment
and intellectual property rights. See Vega Canovas, supra note 3, at 4. These
efforts reflected Mexico's serious intention to seek more aggressive ways ofjoin-
ing the world economy. Id. For a detailed analysis of Mexico's trade structure
and policy before and while joining GATT, see Bucay & Perez Motta, supra note
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needed foreign capital and limited access to the larger U.S. and
Canadian markets for its exports.
Moreover, Mexico's new meritocrats saw the negotiation of
NAFTA as one way of making the Mexican liberalization pro-
gram, underway since 1985,46 more secure. The idea was to lock
in domestic policy reform through an international treaty so
that it would be harder to reverse it in the future. 47 Due to the
fact that the success of its economic liberalization program was
dependent upon gaining access to stable and secure markets, it
was inevitable for Mexico to pursue the broader framework of
NAFTA.48 Consequently, while all three countries realize per-
manent economic gains, Mexico's interest in NAFTA is more
closely motivated by and connected to its domestic liberalization.
Other concerns mirrored those of the Canadians, namely, to
obtain a "safe haven" agreement with Mexico's largest trading
partner in order to avoid being left out of an emerging regional
trade bloc following the Canada-U.S. FTA.49 Much inspired by
the recent European integration,50 the Mexican government
hopes that U.S. and Canadian capital and technology attracted
into Mexico through NAFTA will create profound economic
growth into the twenty-first century.51 Therefore, becoming a
46. The liberalization program called for a radical restructuring of Mexico's
economy by reducing the role of government and eliminating barriers to trade
and investment. See Vega Canovas, supra note 3, at 2. NAFTA is critical to
Mexico because it has become a net exporter of manufactured goods, and this is
a key to sustaining economic growth. Id. at 6.
47. Mexico's participation in the NAFTA negotiations was a direct conse-
quence of its basic economic strategy in the 1980s. One current Mexican objec-
tive in light of NAFTA has been the pursuit of the permanence of its ongoing
economic strategy. See Jesus Silva Herzog, INTRODUCTION TO MEXICO AND THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 3 (Victor Bulmer-Thomas et al. eds.,
1994).
48. In 1983, President de la Madrid initiated Mexico's economic liberaliza-
tion program. See Judith Teichman, Dismantling the Mexican State and Role of
the Private Sector, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
177 (Richard Grinspun & Maxwell A. Cameron eds., 1993). President Carlos
Salinas continued the program. Id.
49. President Salinas stated: "What we want is closer commercial ties with
Canada and the United States, especially in a world in which big regional mar-
kets are being created. We don't want to be left out of any of those regional
markets, especially not out of Canadian and American markets." GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 10, 1990, at B1.
50. President Salinas' trip to Europe in January 1990 significantly influ-
enced his thoughts on the need to secure Mexico's access to the North American
market. At that time, he concluded that Europe was preoccupied with its own
regional integration, EC 1992 and the European Economic Area, as well as the
rebuilding of Eastern Europe. See id.
51. See Vega Canovas, supra note 3, at 2.
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part of the North American regional economic growth plays an
indispensable role in assuring the ultimate success of Mexico's
economic development.
Yet another reason for Mexico's participation in NAFTA
was the need to attract investment.5 2 A study by the United
States International Trade Commission (USITC) estimated that
NAFTA would stimulate a considerable amount of direct invest-
ment from the United States in Mexican infrastructure, manu-
facturing, agriculture, computers, autos, and services (banking,
insurance, securities).5 3 The USITC also reported that NAFTA
would encourage the repatriation of some of the estimated $50
billion in Mexican flight capital.5 4
While NAFTA has primarily the same structure as the Can-
ada-U.S. FTA, Mexican objectives throughout the NAFTA pro-
cess seemed to reflect the desire to use a trade agreement to
underpin domestic policy reform so as to attract incoming for-
eign investment. The primary objective was to use an interna-
tional treaty as a way of securing existing domestic policy
reforms rather than simply to achieve improved and more se-
cure access to the U.S. market in an effort to spur growth. Sub-
sequently, by having the domestic reforms locked in, and a
deeper integration with its most important trading partner,
Mexico's economy would be more efficiently integrated into the
global economy.
III. COMPARISON OF NORTH AMERICAN AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONIST FORCES
A. TRADE ExPANSION IN NORTH AMERICA
We suggest above that the underlying objectives of the two
smaller NAFTA countries for regional trade negotiations reflect
the intellectual underpinnings of the North American FTAs.
These objectives, although somewhat different for Canada and
Mexico respectively, emerged as a result of the rapidly growing
cross-border trade. There was the common desire to allow this
52. According to Vega Canovas, NAFTA would "bolster" investor confi-
dence by offering an important signal of future intentions, and thus encourag-
ing a continued inflow of foreign direct investment. Id. at 6.
53. See generally U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. No. 2275,
REVIEW OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY MEXICO AND
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS (1990) (investigat-
ing Mexico's trade and investment reforms and the implications of those re-
forms for the United States).
54. See id.
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trade expansion to continue and not to be impeded by unilateral
trade actions, as is often the case in anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duties.
In the case of Canada, the primary objective for both the
Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA was to avert the reach of U.S.
anti-dumping and countervailing duties (contingent protection),
and eventually to avoid adverse impact of any future U.S. trade
actions. The underlying aim for Canada was to preserve ex-
isting access to the U.S. market. In the case of Mexico, there
were similar concerns with regard to U.S. trade actions and ac-
cess to the U.S. market. Unlike Canada, Mexico was also pur-
suing further objectives: to adjust its foreign policy towards
accommodation with the first-world rather than withdraw in-
ward as in the past, and to use a regional trade agreement as a
mechanism to secure forward progress of the ongoing domestic
liberalization.
Moreover, because of the asymmetries of country size in-
volved, neither the Canada-U.S. FTA nor the NAFTA negotia-
tions were reciprocity-driven under the GATT principle, where
exchanges of trade concessions are comparable. Instead, the
North American FTAs resulted from mainly unilateral conces-
sions by Canada and Mexico whose objectives were part safe ha-
ven-driven and part domestic. Having sensed such eagerness
from its trading partners in the region, the United States has
been pursuing similar agreements with other countries, and this
has become an important plank of the current U.S. trade
policy. 55
Furthermore, it is the growth of trade and investment,
rather than new institutional agreements, which seems more
likely to propel North American integration forward. For exam-
ple, U.S.-Mexico trade has more than doubled in five years, and
capital inflows into Mexico, largely from the United States, have
risen from less than $0.5 billion in the mid-1980s to over $13
billion in 1992.56 In the case of Canada-U.S. trade, economic
performance across the Canada-U.S. border since the bilateral
agreement has been poor, with little or no increase in Canada-
U.S. trade and even a fall in foreign investment from the United
States to Canada.5 7 The reason is that before the agreement,
the economies of Canada and the United States were already
55. For a discussion of the possible regional extension of NAFTA, see
CUSTA and NAFTA, supra note 6.
56. See Regional Trade Arrangements, supra note 6, at 365.
57. Id.
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highly integrated with low barriers and substantial trade
volume.
The model of North American integration in trade shows no
wider strategic considerations like maintaining regional peace
through growing cross-border trade and factor flows. There was
no desire to pre-specify a process for the three countries to en-
gage in deeper institutionally-based integration for economic se-
curity. In addition, no major objectives of enhancing a region-
wide multilateral negotiating power were present. In all of
these ways, the North American trade integration as reflected
by the two FTAs differs fundamentally from European integra-
tion for which these objectives were the key.
B. THE CONTRAST WITH EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
If the Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA are taken together to
define a new regional economic integration effort in North
America, it is one which sharply differs from the post-war Euro-
pean integration experience. In Europe, the objectives underly-
ing the 1957 Treaty of Rome were as much political and
strategic as they were economic. Having experienced two wars
earlier in the century, building economic interdependence as a
way of underpinning new security arrangements was a key ob-
jective. This was to be done through a phased approach to insti-
tutionally based integration: that is, a common external tariff,
followed by elimination of inter-European duties, harmonization
of taxes, removal of capital market impediments, and eventually
full economic and monetary union. What proved to be a forty-
year process of an ever-expanding regional structure was put in
place, with institutions which, while limited compared to federal
states, were nonetheless significant: a European court, a Euro-
pean Budget, and a Common Agricultural Policy. In addition,
clear supporting objectives underlay the effort, not the least of
which was to provide for a more cohesive European bargaining
unit in trade negotiations with the United States in the GATT.
In contrast, the North American FTAs followed after mar-
ket-driven processes of integration had already substantially in-
creased U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico trade. It was the threat
to this trade from countervailing duty and anti-dumping actions
by the United States which constituted a major concern to Can-
ada, leading to the Canadian drive for a regional agreement.
The objectives of Canada and Mexico seem to have been solely
economic, that is, firmer guarantees of access to the U.S. mar-
ket. These economic objectives, if anything, superseded possible
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political concerns for impairment of national sovereignty by vir-
tue of trade agreements with a large power. In addition, the
reason for the country configuration of the two small approach-
ing the large in North American trade negotiations differs from
the European experience because, in North America, risks of fu-
ture military conflict are not at issue. In short, the two sets of
political and economic circumstances between North America
and Europe are wholly different, and not surprisingly, the re-
sulting agreements are different.
In further contrast to Europe, future North American eco-
nomic integration will probably continue to be driven by the
market-oriented trade and investment forces, rather than by the
intergovernmental institutional arrangements in Europe. There
is no further commitment to or interest in new North American
institutions, North American courts, North American economic
and monetary union, formally harmonized North American capi-
tal markets, and the like. Furthermore, the Canada-U.S. FTA
and NAFTA do not establish institutional structures within
which such integration can take place, because the Free Trade
Commissions established will function effectively as ministerial
meetings, without grant of supra-national autonomy. Thus,
analogies between North American and European processes of
regional economic integration are few.58
IV. CONCLUSION
The respective economic and political objectives of Canada
and Mexico resulted in the negotiations for the 1988 Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the 1992 North American Free
Trade Agreement. After repeated failures for over a century to
negotiate a bilateral trade treaty with the United States, Can-
ada finally formed a firm position in approaching the United
States for a bilateral trade agreement. The objective was to ob-
58. Despite this characterization, however, a remarkable subsequent de-
velopment is that a number of other countries now want to become parties to
these treaties and view accession as part of an integration process. In Latin
America, for example, Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia and other coun-
tries now want to be signatories of NAFTA, seemingly for similar reasons to
those which propelled Mexico. For a discussion of the possible enlargement of
NAFTA, see JOHN WHALLEY, EXPANDING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (Institute For Policy Reform Working Paper No. IPR 42, 1992);
CUSTA and NAFTA, supra note 6. In December 1994, after the conclusion of
the Summit of the Americas, the United States formally invited Chile to begin
negotiations to join NAFTA. Helene Cooper & Jose de Cordoba, Chile is Invited
to Join NAFTA as U.S. Pledges Free-Trade Zone for the Americas, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 12, 1994, at A3.
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viate concerns about unilateral trade actions by the United
States against Canada. More specifically, through the Canada-
U.S. FTA, Canada sought to achieve secure access to the U.S.
market and avert U.S. actions in anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duties. Canada's further participation in the NAFTA ne-
gotiations was to supplement the Canada-U.S. FTA and to
strike a balance between the three countries.
As the main promotor of the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico
aimed at strengthening its ability to participate in the advanced
economies in the region, securing its domestic policy reform
through NAFTA, and like Canada, gaining access to the "safe
haven" of the U.S. market. In addition, Mexico's participation
in NAFTA was motivated by its desire to attract more U.S. in-
vestments to its key industries.
Both the Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA differ in many re-
spects from post-war European integration. In Europe, eco-
nomic integration resulted from the strong common desire to
form a political and strategic alliance within the countries con-
cerned. Thus, the European Union was formed with many insti-
tutionalized structures within its economic system. In North
America, economic objectives, rather than political interests,
provided the underlying momentum for the negotiation process
for both the Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA.
Whether we are witnessing the emergence of an integrated
North American trade bloc built upon the Canada-U.S. FTA and
NAFTA, and how economic integration will play out in the next
few years in North America and elsewhere, remain to be seen.
Our view, however, is that the recent North American trade
agreements contribute relatively little to this integration pro-
cess because they are substantively limited and largely reflect
smaller country objectives. If our assessment of these agree-
ments is correct, economic arrangements in North America will
not change much in the future because of them. Trading pat-
terns rather than trade agreements will likely be the key to any
further North American integration, and the formation of
whatever one might term as a North American trade bloc will
remain market-driven rather than institution-based.
[Vol. 4:43
1995] NORTH AmERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 69
APPENDIX I
A CHRONOLOGY OF CANADA-UNITED STATES
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
1854 Reciprocity Treaty (Elgin-Marcy Treaty) concluded between Canada
and the United States. Terms include free trade in primary
products such as fish, lumber, grain, and coal. The treaty was to
last ten years, at which time twelve months notice had to be given
if either country withdrew.
1866 United States withdraws from the Reciprocity Treaty.
1867 Canadian Confederation.
1868-97 Canadian tariff policy includes a standing offer of reciprocity with
the United States along the lines of the 1854 Elgin-Marcy Treaty.
1869 The Canadian minister of finance visits Washington, offering free
or equal access to Canadian fisheries and canals and reciprocal free
entry of certain manufactures in return for free entry of Canadian
natural products into the United States. U.S. government
expresses disinterest.
1870 Bill introduced in the Canadian Parliament that would provide for
a commercial union between Canada and the United States.
1871 Great Britain and United States conclude the Treaty of
Washington to regulate the use of inshore fisheries and national
waterways between Canada and the United States. Sir John A.
Macdonald proposes renewal of 1854 treaty to compensate Canada
for opening its fisheries and waterways. The United States refuses
to negotiate on that basis.
1874 Liberal government sends an envoy to Washington to assist the
British in drafting a treaty that includes a tariff-free list of natural
resources and a substantial number of manufactured articles. The
U.S. Senate refuses to consider the draft treaty because Canada
insists on extending any free trade arrangements to include Great
Britain.
1879 Introduction of Macdonald's National Policy, aimed at providing a
secure national market for Canadian manufactures. Government
support for westward settlement intended to strengthen this
market, which in turn would be encouraged through the
development of a national transportation system.
1891 Canadian government agrees to send a delegation to Washington to
negotiate a trade agreement with the United States. Negotiations
fail.
1896 Laurier proposes reciprocity with the United States but is turned
down. He states that "tihere will be no more pilgrimages to
Washington. We are turning our hopes to the Old Motherland."
1897 Fielding introduces the Dominion Tariff. This tariff increases many
duties but contains separate tariffs toward the United States,
allowing Canada to retaliate against the American Dingley tariff
rates without raising the general level of tariffs in Canada. Tariff
preferences toward the British go unreciprocated.
1907 Establishment of a triple-schedule tariff in Canada, with the
United States subject to the highest tariffs.
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1909 Payne-Aldrich Tariff on newsprint introduced in the United States,
enabling the United States to impose maximum rates against
countries that discriminate against the United States.
1910 Laurier is confronted by farmers in western Canada wanting
reciprocity with the United States, especially in farm implements.
United States charges that Canadian concessions to France in 1906
constituted discrimination against the United States, and that they
would unwillingly have to enforce maximum rates of the Payne-
Aldrich Act against Canada. U.S. delegation visits Ottawa in
March. Canada is ready to negotiate reciprocal trade concessions
with the minimum tariff as a basis.
1911 Agreement reached with the United States in January for free
trade to be enacted by concurrent legislation. The agreement
provides for free trade mostly in primary products and a small
number of manufactured products, such as iron and steel sheets,
and reciprocal tariff reductions on a wide range of other articles.
Of particular significance is the duty-free access for Canadian
newsprint to the United States. In the United States, President
Taft has much difficulty getting bill passed.
In Canada, debate in Parliament forces Liberals to call a
September election.
During the election campaign, Conservatives show strong
imperialist sentiment. They stress that free trade with the United
States would mean increased competition for Canadian farmers
because of the earlier U.S. growing season; would jeopardize
relations with Britain; and would risk importing U.S. economic
difficulties such as unemployment. Liberals stress the benefits of a
larger market under free trade.
Results: Laurier (Liberals) loses; Borden (Conservatives) wins;
reciprocity defeated.
1913 Prospects for free trade with the United States undermined for
extended period. Underwood Tariff allows for duty-free access of
Canadian newsprint.
1921 United States introduces emergency tariffs.
1922 United States introduces Fordney-McCumber tariffs.
1930 Canada introduces higher tariffs. United States introduces Smoot-
Hawley Tariffs.
1932 Agreement at the Ottawa conference produces British Preferential
Trading System-first instance of reciprocated Imperial Preference.
United States increases revenue duties.
1933 "Buy America" Act implemented in the United States, providing a
preference margin of 6% for a domestic bid over a foreign bid
(including duties). Preference raised to 12% if the domestic bidder
is a small business.
1934 United States introduced Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
(Roosevelt Good Neighbor Policy).
1935 Canada-U.S. Bilateral Agreement. Canada grants United States
most-favored-nation status and, in some products, tariff reductions
below intermediate rates.
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1937-38 In return for U.S. tariff reductions, Canada and Britain further
reduce tariffs and remove some of their preferences. Canada and
United States trade on MFN basis, but Canada maintains
Commonwealth preferences.
1941 Hyde Park Declaration. Bilateral cooperation in the defense field
agreed to between Canada and the United States (Defense
Production Sharing Agreement).
1942 Canada agrees in an exchange of notes with the United States to
work toward a reduction in tariffs.
1943 Canada is prepared to abolish preferences in the tariff schedule,
provided the United States and United Kingdom are willing to
make compensatory tariff reductions. Polls in Canada indicate
strong support for free trade with United States reflecting strong
internationalist sentiment during the war.
1945 Canada hopes United States will make "multilateral horizontal"
tariff reductions (major across-the-board cuts). U.S. Congressional
pressure opposes these cuts, only selective cuts possible. British
continue to link willingness to remove Imperial Preferences to
sweeping American tariff cuts. U.S. Congress does not agree.
1947 Canadian dollar position regarded as serious. Canadian
government declares itself willing to enter into a free trade
agreement even if this necessitates a major readjustment and
reorientation of Canada's international trade. Canadian
government imposes "dollar-saving" restrictions the same day it
signs the GAIT. GAITr Treaty signed in October.
1948 Canadian and American negotiators settle on the basis for a
general trade agreement. Included are the immediate removal of
all duties by both countries; the prohibition of all quantitative
restrictions on imports after five years (with important exceptions
on both sides); the inclusion of the right of both sides to impose
absolute transitional quotas on certain products during the five-
year period, and joint consultation on agricultural marketing.
Prime Minister King pressed by advisers to move forward but flatly
refuses, stating: "I stressed strongly that regardless of what the
economic facts might be, the issue would turn on union with the
States and separation from Britain."
1965 Canada-U.S. Automobile Products Trade Agreement (Auto Pact)
concluded, provides for conditional duty-free trade between Canada
and the United States in original equipment, automotive parts, and
accessories (except tires and tubes) and in all but specialized types
of motor vehicles.
1968 Canada and the United States disagree over interpretation of the
objectives of the Auto Pact and the retention of the Canadian
safeguard conditions. This marks the beginning of continuing
differences over the Auto Pact, generally resolved following
bilateral negotiations.
1969-70 Increasing global integration and interdependence are factors
causing both Canada and the United States to undertake major
reviews of foreign policy approaches and positions.
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1971 The Nixon Administration, in reaction to continuing U.S. balance-
of-payments problems, takes the United States off the gold
standard, devalues the U.S. dollar and imposes a surtax on imports
(motor vehicles imported from Canada are exempted). Canada is
unsuccessful in seeking exemption from surtax, representing the
first time after World War II that Canada is not excluded from a
major U.S. economic policy action.
1972 The "special" economic relationship is officially ended by President
Nixon in his address to the House of Commons. "It is time for
Canadians and Americans to move beyond the sentimental rhetoric
of the past. It is time for us to recognize that we have very
separate identities; that we have significant differences, and that
nobody's interests are furthered when these realities are obscured."
Canada adopts an Import Surveillance Program designed to
identify export-tied tax reductions abroad, such as that offered
under DISC.
1974 U.S. Trade Act initiates Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the
GATT. Includes a provision authorizing the president to negotiate
bilateral free trade agreements with North American countries.
The Trade Act signals a switch from trade policy as an instrument
of overall U.S. foreign policy, to trade policy as an explicit
instrument of U.S. economic self-interest.
1978 The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (Van Roggen
Report) recommends that serious consideration be given to bilateral
free trade with the United States.
1979 U.S. Trade Agreement Act concludes Tokyo Round Negotiations.
1983 Canadian External Affairs issues a Review of Foreign Trade Policy
and suggests that the government consider the advisability of
sectoral free trade with the United States in urban transport
equipment, textiles, agricultural equipment, and petrochemicals.
1983-84 Series of cases involving the possibility of countervailing duties and
safeguards measures in the United States cause alarm in Canada.
Softwood lumber, carbon, steel, copper, and pork are all threatened
with trade-restricting measures which would adversely affect
Canadian access to U.S. markets.
1984 Generally positive reaction by the United States to the free trade
initiative. Red meat and computer services added to the list of
items for consideration.
Autumn: The Senate and House of Representatives pass a bill
authorizing the Reagan Administration to negotiate bilateral trade
agreements. Legislation names only Canada and Israel as possible
partners.
November: Donald Macdonald, Chairman of the Royal Commission
on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada,
announces his support for a free trade agreement with the United
States.
1985 March 18: At the "Shamrock Summit" in Quebec City, President
Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney sign Declaration on Trade in
Goods and Services which aims to promote a secure climate for
bilateral trade.
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September 5: Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic
Union and Development Prospects for Canada released. Report
urges negotiations for a free trade agreement with the United
States.
September 26: Prime Minister announces in Parliament that
Canada would pursue a trade agreement with the United States in
order to "secure, expand and enhance" access to U.S. markets.
October 1: Prime Minister requests in writing negotiations to
reduce barriers in goods and services. October 2: President
Reagan accepts ,Canadian proposals.
December 10: President Reagan notifies Congress of intent to seek
fast-track authority to negotiate Canada-U.S. free trade agreement.
1986 April 23: The U.S. Senate Finance Committee grants negotiating
authority in a 10-10 vote.
October 16: Canada affected by a number of protectionist
measures, especially a Commerce Department ruling to impose a
51% duty on Canadian lumber.
Seven meetings held between the Chief Negotiators-Simon
Reisman for Canada and Peter Murphy for the United States.
1987 January 27: In the annual State of the Union Address, President
Reagan states commitment "to complete an historic free trade
arrangement between the world's two largest trading partners-
Canada and the United States."
September 23: During negotiations in Washington (22nd meeting
since the start of the talks), Canadian Chief Negotiator Simon
Reisman walks out of the negotiations, stating that "[tihe U.S. is
not responding on elements fundamental to Canada's position. I
have therefore suspended the negotiations."
September 25: In a speech, Canadian Trade Minister Pat Carney
outlines Canadian demands that the United States must respond
to if negotiations are to begin: clear rules on what is fair trade
practice; speedy binding resolutions to disputes over matters such
as duties imposed by each country on the other's products;
increased access to each other's agricultural and food products in a
balanced way; changes in automotive trade only if increased
production and employment in both countries; removal of all tariffs
and non-tariff barriers between the two countries and no new
barriers introduced.
September 28 and October 1: High-level meetings held to resolve
differences.
October 2-3: Final negotiating session in Washington.
October 4: Prime Minister Mulroney announces an agreement in
principle.
1988 January 2: President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney sign
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement which goes into
effect January 1, 1989.
SOURCES:
John Whalley et al., Canadian Trade Policies and the World Economy, in 9
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT
PROSPECTS FOR CANADA 35-39 (1985).
CANADA, DEP'T OF EXT. AFF., CANADA-U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: A
CHRONOLOGY (1987).
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APPENDIX II
A CHRONOLOGY OF MEXICO-U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
1980 After negotiating to accede to the GATT, Mexico decides against
joining, mainly for political reasons, including the desire not to
have Mexico's trade too closely tied to the United States.
Emphasis remains on "development from within."
1982 August 8: Debt crisis. Mexico announces it cannot make scheduled
payments on its $8.6 billion of debt. The IMF provides assistance.
Trade dispute investigations increase in the United States against
Mexico. Six cases mainly dealing with agricultural products,
chemicals and steel.
1983 President de la Madrid announces intention to open and modernize
the Mexican economy.
Seven complaints investigated by the U.S. International Trade
Commission involving cement, bricks and tiles, glass and other
steel products.
1984 USITC conducts eight more investigations. Option of a free trade
area between Mexico and the United States raised by Steven
Weintraub.
1985 April: The United States and Mexico conclude a three-year
bilateral Understanding on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.
Mexico to be given the "injury test" in the United States
countervailing duty investigations. In return, Mexico agrees to
eliminate export subsidy programs.
July 25: Mexican Executive Decree introduces major trade reforms
to rationalize import policy in an effort to stimulate economic
adjustment and increase non-oil exports.
1986 Mexico joins the GATT. Terms of accession not nearly as liberal as
those negotiated in 1979. Mexico committed to extensive trade
liberalization program.
1987 The United States and Mexico conclude Framework Agreement
establishing a bilateral consultation mechanism for trade and
investment. Immediate Action Agenda also set up with bilateral
consultations in following areas: textiles, agriculture, steel,
investment, technology transfer, electronics, intellectual property,
and services.
1988 President Salinas takes office.
1989 The United States and Mexico sign Understanding on Trade and
Investment Facilitation Talks (TIFTs) which stems from the 1987
Framework Agreement. The TIFTs provide an umbrella for talks
in specific product areas. An Action Plan is also signed. Talks
begin in November on standards, testing and certification, and
petrochemicals.
The United States doubles its quota on Mexican steel.
Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives
requests the USITC to conduct a two-part study on Mexican trade
and investment reforms and provide a summary of experts' views
on the prospects for future U.S.-Mexican trade relations. The
study reports that an overwhelming majority of experts support an
FTA between the United States and Mexico as a way of enhancing
their bilateral relationship.
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1990 January: President Salinas goes to Europe and realizes
preoccupation with regional integration (EC 1992, EEA) and
rebuilding Eastern Europe. Concludes Mexico had better seek
closer ties with the United States (and Canada).
February: Agreement with the United States on textiles.
Eliminates quantitative restrictions on 52 types of Mexican textiles
and increased quotas for 38 other categories.
March 15: Canada and Mexico sign 10 bilateral agreements
covering the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism,
ending double taxation, improving customs procedures, and
initiating projects to develop agriculture and forestry.
March 28: Mexico and the United States announce intention to
work toward a formal PTA. Salinas pledges to first consult with
domestic groups and the Mexican Senate before proceeding.
May 22: Mexican Senate agrees with the Salinas initiative to open
free trade negotiations with the United States. Senate report
states U.S.-Mexico FTA would complement trade liberalization
policies of Mexican president, but recommends against pursuing a
common market.
June 10: Presidents Bush and Salinas announce intention to
initiate negotiations for a comprehensive FTA.
August 21: President Salinas writes to President Bush to formally
request FTA negotiations.
September 24: Canadian Trade Minister announces Canada will
seek to join negotiations with the United States and Mexico.
1991 February: Mexico requests a GATT dispute settlement panel to
investigate a U.S. embargo on tuna imports. The United States
implemented the embargo in October 1990 according to its Marine
Mammal Protection Act which establishes standards for tuna
fishing in the tropical Eastern Pacific in order to reduce incidental
dolphin kill. The embargo also applies to intermediary countries.
February 5: President Bush formally informs Congress of his
intention to begin talks with Mexico and Canada to create a North
American Free Trade Area.
March 1: President Bush requests a two-year extension of fast-
track negotiating authority which would allow the Uruguay Round
negotiations to be completed and allow the NAFTA negotiations to
begin.
Opposition in the United States mounts to fast-track negotiating
authority for NAFTA and for the NAFTA negotiations in general.
Opponents include labor groups, textile and apparel manufacturers,
farmers, consumer groups and environmentalists.
May 1: The Bush Administration submits an "Action Plan" to
Congress outlining how labor and environmental concerns will be
addressed in the negotiations with Mexico in order to secure
enough support for fast-track negotiating authority.
May 24: Congress grants fast-track authority. Two-year extension
given to complete the Uruguay Round and begin NAFTA talks.
June 11: Negotiations between Mexico, the United States, and
Canada for a North American FTA begin.
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Discussions lead to 18 working groups classified under 6 topic
headings. Under the Market Access group, sectoral interests are
reflected, including agriculture, autos, textiles, energy, as well as
tariff/non-tariff barriers, rules of origin and government
procurement. Other broad negotiating groups include Trade Rules,
Services, Investment, Intellectual Property, and Dispute
Settlement. According to the "Action Plan" environmental concerns
are to be dealt with on a parallel track.
September: The GATT Panel Report on the "Tuna-Dolphin"
dispute is released. The Panel agrees that the U.S. embargo was
inconsistent with GATT disciplines, but that the U.S. "dolphin
safe" labelling provision is consistent.
1992 August 12: NAFTA negotiations are concluded. Once ratified by
the governments involved, it is scheduled to go into effect January
1, 1994.
September 8: U.S. Congress opens hearings on NAFTA. The Bush
Administration stresses NAFTA will create new jobs for Americans.
November 3: Bill Clinton elected President of the United States.
He supports NAFTA, but promises to negotiate side agreements on
the environment and labor.
December 17: Leaders of the three governments sign NAFTA. The
agreement must still be ratified by the legislatures.
1993 March 17-18: Negotiations on the side agreements begin in
Washington.
August 13: Canada, the United States and Mexico complete
negotiations on North American Agreements on Labor and
Environmental Co-operation.
October 25: Jean Chrdtien elected Prime Minister of Canada.
Promises to reopen NAFTA negotiations.
November 17: U.S. House of Representatives passes NAFTA
legislation. Clinton Administration had to engage in last minute
negotiations to ensure sufficient support, but NAFTA passes with a
vote of 234 to 200.
November 20: U.S. Senate ratifies NAFTA.
November 29: U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor meets
Canadian Minister for International Trade Roy MacLaren to
discuss Canadian concerns.
December 1: Prime Minister Chrdtien announces Canadian
concerns are satisfied for improvements in NAFTA on environment
and labor, subsidies, anti-dumping, dispute resolution, and energy.
1994 January 1: NAFTA goes into effect.
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